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depended the preservation of real estate is action of a definite and substantial character. The promise actually did induce this identical action or
forbearance.
The final proviso is contained in the statement "if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." The appellant company is
engaged in a public calling, upon which the appellee relied to fulfill its
promise to care for the property of the promisee by turning off the water.
It might even well be argued that under its duty to furnish adequate facilities, the company was bound to shut off the water when a customer desired
to terminate the relationship. As a result of such reliance, the promisee,
thus entrusting its property, suffered considerable injury thereto, which
can be remedied only by compensation in the form of damages. Injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Probably one of the most glaring examples of injustice resulting from
reliance on the gratuitous promise is the case of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala.
131. There a brother-in-law advised the widow of her brother to sell her
lands and come to him, promising that he would give her a place in which
to raise her family. The widow gave up her lands, went to the promisor,
and was provided for during a short time, but was then requested to get
out. Relief was denied on the ground that such a mere gratuitous promise
would not be enforced. That case was probably correctly decided in 1845,
but as exemplified by the Restatement cited above, there has been considerable development in formulating a workable doctrine of promissory estoppel
since that date. Despite this fact, the principal case has been added to the
category of Kirksey v. Kirksey, supra, supporting an archaic view that is
P. J. D.
inherently unjust.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-PROHIBITION OF MANUFACTURE
OF MATTRESSES OF SHODDY-Defendant was indicted, charged and convicted
for unlawfully manufacturing mattresses from material made of shoddy
under Statute, Sec. 8250, Burns' Ann. St. 1926. The assignment of errors
was the overruling of motion to quash indictment and motion for new trial.
The defendant complained the statute was unconstitutional as beyond the
limit of the police power. Held, The statute is constitutional but the case
must be reversed, because indictment failed to set out facts charging a
public offense. Weisenberger v. State, Sup. Ct. of Ind., March 4, 1931,
175 N. E. 238.
An inconsistency seemingly exists between the interpretation of the statute and the indictment. The former was construed liberally and upheld
whereas the latter was construed strictly and held faulty. The statute was
construed to mean that any manufacture or sale of mattresses made from
unsanitary or contaminated shoddy should be a penal offense. The indictment, following the language of the statute made no reference to unsanitary
shoddy but charged in general terms. The rules of construction applicable
to the two are quite different so that the decisions might be reconciled.
Courts will make presumptions in favor of the constitutionality of a statute until the contrary clearly appears. Hays v. Tippy, 91 Ind. 102; State
ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382. The rule of construction of indictments has always been very strict because of public policy in favor of
having an accused person apprised of his offense in clear and concise terms.
Bates v. State, 31 Ind. 72; Schmidt v. State, 78 Ind. 41.

RECENT CASE NOTES
To uphold the statute, as construed, the court relies upon the police
power. Government possesses three distinctly great powers: police power,
taxation and eminent domain. The term police power, better remains undefined concisely, but there are certain attributes that are cognizable:
(1) It aims to secure the public welfare; (2) It does so by restraint and
compulsion. It has been defined as the inherent right to regulate the enjoyment of property, to maintain public order, to secure rights of citizenship and to prevent the injury to private rights. Freund, Police Power,
p. 4; Western Union Telegraph v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12. The abstract
terminology as expressed by the courts have allowed the terms to include
and express elastic social, economic and political conditions, so as to be
capable of development. The power has several constitutional limitations
upon it, the chief of which is the "due process" clause of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. This has been construed to mean the
legislatures can not pass restriction upon property or personal liberty unless there is a social interest to warrant the interference. The chief interests being public health, safety, and morals. Walter v. Jameson, 140
Ind. 581; Chicago v. Anderson, 182 Ind. 140. The discretion of the Legislature is limited only by the Constitutional provisions for the Courts will
not inquire into the expediency of the legislation. State v. Richcreek, 167
Ind. 217.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana is only in keeping with
the bulk of state legislation upheld in kindred matters of health by the
United States Supreme Court. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U. S. 11 (Vaccination); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.
S. 306 (Garbage); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (Physicians' Examination); Powell v. Pa., 127 U. S. 678 (Oleomargarine); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (Working Hours). The limit placed on legislation for
health seems to have been a minimum wage scale for women. Adkins V.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525.
The chief difficulty in rationalizing the cases is not upon the principles
set forth, but upon results. The application of the rules to the situation
usually brings forth the question whether or not the public health, safety,
or morals is endangered and requires the legislation passed. Then the
problem arises of gathering reliable information and statistics for the
court's assistance in getting a proper aspect of the case. This was very
effectively done by Justice Brandeis when appearing as Counsel for the
State in Muller v. Oregon (208 U. S. 412) dealing with the hours of labor
for women. The proper insight into the problems of national policy requires abundant material and profound analysis of the subject matter.
Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action, 38 Har. L. Rev., 6.
In the principal case our court repudiated the doctrine found in dicta of
some decisions of the United States Supreme Court, stating that governmental powers are limited by natural rights of persons. Fletcher v. Peck,
6 Cranch 87, 135; Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Calder v. Bull, 3
Dall. 386, 388. There is a definite subscription to the principle that the
powers are limited only by the 14th Amendment with the test of reasonableness determinable by the court itself.
The result of the case seems very satisfactory for it allows those rights
only to be taken which are needed for protection of health. The evidence
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here failed to show that the manufacture or sale of mattresses made from
shoddy which was sterilized would in any way lie perilous to the public
although they were made from second-hand material. There was no public
good to be derived by such a deprivation of personal liberty in seeking a
R. R. D.
living. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-The plaintiff engaged in the business
of operating an automotive stage line over the highways between two
points in California, carrying passengers, freight, the United States mail
and parcel post. The state levied a tax of $2,978.78 for the year 1927
against plaintiff on gross receipts of $60,986.47 for 1926. Plaintiff paid
half the first installment under protest and brought suit to recover $1,057.16, the portion of the tax assessed against the revenue derived from the
carriage of the mails and parcel post. Held, judgment on demurrer for the
defendant. Alward v. Johnson, Supreme Court of the United States, Feb.
24, 1931, 51 Sup. Ct. 273; 75 L. Ed. 354. (The opinion of the Supreme
Court of California in this case may be found in 166 Cal. 244, 135, p. 971.)
The constitution of California divides all property within the state for
taxation purposes into classes and provides for different burdens upon
them. Sec. 15, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides for a tax on the gross
earnings of persons (companies, corporations, etc.) engaged in the business
of transporting persons or property, as a common carrier for compensation
over any public highway within the state; and this section declares that
that tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county, and
municipal. The plaintiff's first contention is that this classification is unreasonable and discriminatory. A tax on gross receipts has repeatedly been
upheld when in lieu of all other taxes. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.
S.330, 43 Sup. Ct. 336; United States Express Co. v. Minn., 223 U. S. 335,
32 Sup. Ct. 211; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minn., 246 U. S. 450, 38 Sup. Ct.
373. The Supreme Court appears to be committed definitely to the proposition that such a tax is a property tax. The method of reasoning is something like this: by the systemization and unification of properties used
by a public service, or any other business, these properties acquire in the
aggregate a special value by virtue of this unity to use. This special value
is in the nature of property. A fair tax on gross earnings bears such a
relation to the value of these properties under their unity of use as to
justify it as being a legal and commutated or substituted tax for other taxes
which were or might have been levied. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142
U. S.217, 12 Sup. Ct. 121; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 17
Sup. Ct. 305; United States Express Co. v. Minn., supra. From the beginning the California courts have treated the tax on gross receipts as one on
property. 'San Francisco v. Pacific T.& T. Co., 166 Cal. 244, 135 Pac. 971;
Pacific Gas & Elect. Co. v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 420, 143, p. 700. In the latter
case the court said: ". . . a small amount in value of .. . property could,
by use in business, bring in returns by way of revenue greatly in excess of
the separate value of the properties employed. This earning capacity . . .
had a value which should be taxed, and no better method of taxing it was
apparent than that which levied a percentage upon the gross revenue returns." The fact that the California constitution specifically provides that
this tax shall be in lieu of all other taxes and shall be only on receipts

